DOJ Finalizes Rule Creating a § 922(g) Firearms Rights Restoration Process

On Monday, August 17, Attorney General Todd Blanche announced a final rule that establishes a formal process by which people prohibited by federal law from possessing firearms can apply for restoration of their federal firearms rights.

The rule will take effect 30 days after publication in the Federal Register and comes as courts across the country grapple with the constitutionality of § 922(g)’s categorical prohibitions on firearm ownership. It also follows the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Hemani decision, which held that the federal law barring unlawful drug users from possessing firearms (§ 922(g)(3)) was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment as-applied to Hemani. Attorney General Blanche explained that this new online application process will “likely obviate the need for some portion of this litigation,” allowing qualifying individuals to exercise their Second Amendment rights “while still protecting public safety.”

The final rule is available here, and the Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) July 2025 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NPRM”) is available here.

Background

The Gun Control Act

The Gun Control Act of 1968 (“GCA”) includes 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which prohibits nine categories of individuals from shipping, transporting, receiving, or possessing firearms or ammunition in interstate or foreign commerce. Those categories are: 

A § 922(g) violation constitutes a felony offense and can carry up to 15 years in federal prison and fines up to $250,000. In fiscal year 2025, federal courts convicted 7,245 individuals of violating § 922(g), and 89% of those convictions were felon-in-possession offenses.

Section 925(c)

People barred from possessing firearms under § 922(g) can apply to have their rights restored via 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), which the Attorney General is responsible for administering. The Attorney General may grant restoration after finding that (1) the applicant “will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety” and (2) granting relief “would not be contrary to the public interest.” Individuals whose application is denied may seek judicial review in federal district court. 

Although the statute vests that authority in the Attorney General, the Attorney General previously delegated it to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”). Since 1992, however, Congress has used annual appropriations riders to bar ATF from spending any funds to process individual § 925(c) applications. Those riders have kept the restoration process dormant for more than 30 years.

In March 2025, the Attorney General issued an interim final rule that withdrew ATF’s delegation and reasserted DOJ’s direct authority over the § 925(c) process, clearing the way for the current rulemaking.

Key Provisions of the Final Rule

Application Requirements

DOJ plans to launch an online portal for applications. It estimates that the rule will affect approximately 330,000 individuals each year, with as many as one million applications expected in the first year.

Applicants must submit:

1. A statement identifying all applicable firearms prohibitions;
2. Written consent authorizing DOJ to conduct its review;
3. Fingerprint scans or completed Federal Bureau of Investigation forms;
4. Information relevant to each disqualifying category;
5. A criminal record check;
6. Three character references; and
7. An affirmation from the applicant that the representations are true.

DOJ estimates that applicants will need 65 minutes to complete the application. The application carries a $30 fee, which DOJ may waive or reduce. DOJ plans to reassess the fee every two years.

DOJ will also consider factors beyond the application materials, including the applicant’s full criminal history, the seriousness of prior conduct, charges that prosecutors dismissed in exchange for plea agreements, and the applicant’s conduct while serving a sentence.

Applicants may correct and resubmit defective applications within 30 days. If DOJ denies a prior application under certain provisions, that denial creates a presumption against future eligibility.

Tiered Evaluation

The rule creates a tiered framework that largely tracks the likelihood that different types of prior convictions will lead to recidivism. It places applicants in one of three groups: (1) presumptive disqualification, (2) a five- or ten-year waiting period, or (3) no presumptive treatment, the rule’s primary recipients.

 Presumptively Disqualified Applicants: These applicants may obtain relief only under “extraordinary circumstances.” Although DOJ declined to define that term in order to preserve a case-by-case approach, it explained that “certain common factors are likely to be present where extraordinary circumstances are found.” Those factors include: (1) the circumstances of the underlying offense, (2) the seriousness of the offense, (3) the applicant’s age at the time of the offense, (4) the applicant’s level of “remorse and atonement,” and (5) the “presence of an exceptionally long period of non-criminal conduct.”

Offenses: This tier covers serious offenses “that are closely linked to dangerousness,” allowing the DOJ to make “self-evident” determinations. It includes violent crimes, crimes closely associated with violence, and offenses whose perpetrators exhibit high recidivism rates. DOJ presumptively disqualifies individuals whom courts convict of committing, attempting, soliciting, or conspiring to commit, or aiding or abetting the commission of any of the following felonies:

• the death of another person; 
• rape, sexual abuse, or sexual assault; 
• human trafficking; 
• kidnapping; 
• intimate partner or domestic violence; 
• burglary; 
• robbery; 
• extortion; 
• carjacking; 
• arson; 
• racketeering (if at least one predicate racketeering act involves violence); 
• gang-related offenses; 
• maiming, assault, or battery; 
• stalking; 
• escape or rescue of a person in custody; 
• terrorism; 
• witness tampering; 
• brandishing or discharging a firearm or using an explosive; or 
• acts that match or resemble the conduct above.

Statuses: DOJ presumptively disqualifies individuals with certain statuses because “his or her conduct demonstrates ongoing disregard for the law, triggers exclusion from the right to bear arms, or carries a time-limited prohibition that the individual can independently cure before applying for relief.”

Some of these statuses are specific § 922(g) categories:

• fugitives from justice under § 922(g)(2);
• unlawful users of, or persons addicted to, a controlled substance under § 922(g)(3), except for marijuana users;
• persons with a mental-health related disability under § 922(g)(4) who have not applied, or have been denied by, a relevant relief-from-disability program;
• aliens unlawfully or temporarily present in the country under § 922(g)(5);
• persons whom a court has placed under a protective or restraining order that § 922(g)(8) covers.

Unlike the NPRM, the final rule excludes marijuana from the definitions of “controlled substance” and “unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance.” DOJ explained that it made this change in response to the Supreme Court’s Hemani decision, in which regular marijuana use did not establish that Hemani posed a danger to himself or others. DOJ acknowledged the exclusion “goes beyond the facts at issue” in that case but called it “necessary to improve the administrability of the restoration process.”

Other statuses turn on circumstances, including:

• awaiting sentencing for any crime;
• incarceration or serving any part of a sentence;
• participating in a program that diverts a conviction or substitutes for a conviction;
• a legal requirement to register as a sex offender for an offense that bars firearm ownership. 

Waiting Periods: The rule imposes 5- and 10-year waiting periods on individuals with certain prior convictions. During those periods, DOJ presumptively disqualifies applicants. The clock starts when a court convicts the individual or when the individual begins serving any part of a state or federal sentence. The rule treats participation in a program in lieu of criminal conviction as a conviction.

Offenses that trigger a 10-year waiting period include:

• Felony convictions involving:
  • drug trafficking, including conduct such as manufacturing, selling, distributing, importing, or exporting;
  • threats of violence;
  • manufacturing, possessing, transferring, or using explosives;
  • certain firearm- or ammunition-related conduct;
  • possessing or discharging a firearm or other weapon on school property; or
  • animal abuse.
• Misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence under § 922(g)(9). The 10-year clock restarts if, within 10 years after a court convicts the individual of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence or the individual serves any part of a sentence for that crime, any of the following occurs:
  • The individual incurs any other disability set forth in § 922(g);
  • A law enforcement officer arrests the individual for:
    • a felony;
    • a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence; or
    • any other offense involving the commission of, or an attempt to commit:
      • acts or threats of violence;
      • brandishing or discharging a firearm; or
      • using an explosive. 

Offenses that trigger a 5-year waiting period include:

• all other felonies; and
• misdemeanor assault, battery, stalking, or threatened act of violence.

No Presumptive Treatment: The rule primarily benefits people whose offenses DOJ considers less likely to lead to recidivism. These categories, which are subject to the limitations discussed above, include certain § 922(g)(1) felonies, presumably non-violent felonies occurring outside the 5-year waiting period; mental health adjudications under § 922(g)(4), provided the applicant has completed a relevant relief-from-disability program; dishonorable discharges under  § 922(g)(6); renunciations of citizenship under § 922(g)(7); and misdemeanor domestic violence convictions under § 922(g)(9) satisfying the 10-year waiting period and category-specific 10-year clock restart.

Applicants in these categories must provide DOJ with information about the circumstances and nature of their offense. Applicants under § 922(g)(4) must also submit a certification from a licensed mental health professional stating that they are unlikely to pose a danger to themselves or others.

Implications

The final rule represents the first operational § 925(c) firearm restoration process in more than three decades. In many ways, comments from stakeholders on the 2025 NPRM offer insight into the potential pushback that the final rule will face.

Most obviously: is DOJ’s list of presumptively disqualifying offenses too broad or too narrow? Stakeholders proposed adding hate crimes, alcohol-related offenses, aggravated domestic violence offenses, and suicide risk to the presumptively disqualifying categories. Conversely, some commentators urged DOJ to remove sex offenses, violent conduct as it is broadly defined, drug offenses, firearm offenses, explosive offenses, animal abuse, and restrictions on non-citizens from the NPRM’s presumptively disqualified categories. Ultimately, the final rule did modify some categories to reflect these concerns: DOJ removed marijuana use from the § 922(g)(3) section, shifted animal abuse and firearm offenses to the 10-year waiting period, and added more safeguards to address suicide risk. Yet, throughout, DOJ echoed that drawing a stark line on presumptively lawful categories would hinder its preference for a case-by-case approach. 

Relatedly, is a case-by-case approach the right one? Some Second Amendment advocacy groups pushed back on DOJ’s individualized assessment, favoring automatic restoration for certain groups. Indeed, similar arguments characterized the application process itself as unduly burdensome.

On the other side of the ledger, some pro-regulation groups accused DOJ of engaging in an individual rights balancing test. This balancing, they explained, is wholly removed from § 925(c)’s statutory mission of ensuring individuals seeking restoration would not be a danger to public safety. Additionally, some groups argued that § 922(g) individuals are not “ordinary, law-abiding citizens” protected by the Second Amendment, citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).

Lastly: with the fact-specific nature of the application process, will it be administrable? DOJ is building institutional capacity from scratch, and the online portal will require staffing, technology, intake procedures, and review standards. As discussed, DOJ estimates as many as one million applications in the rule’s first year. The program’s ability to manage that demand and process individualized claims consistently will determine whether it delivers meaningful results.

Despite these uncertainties, the final rule could have a sizeable effect on the landscape of Second Amendment litigation. By giving certain § 922(g) prohibited persons a cheaper and likely faster route towards restoration of their firearms rights, we could see fewer § 922(g) as-applied challenges moving forward.