Early last December, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) formally opened a first-of-its-kind Second Amendment Section (“SAS”), housed within the Department’s Civil Rights Division. In tandem with a broader Second Amendment Enforcement Task Force and led by Acting Chief Barry Arrington under Assistant Attorney General Harmeet Dhillon, the SAS has filed five complaints so far:
|
Case |
Filing Date |
Defendants |
Basis for Complaint |
Current Status |
|
United States v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 2:25-cv-09323 (C.D. Cal.). |
9/30/2025 |
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department; Sheriff Luna. |
Department’s administration of Cal. Penal Code § 26202(d) (requiring licensing authorities to give written notice of an initial determination on a new concealed carry license application within 90 days). |
Pre-discovery; December 2026 mandatory settlement conference deadline; January 2027 jury trial scheduled. |
|
United States v. Gov’t of the Virgin Islands, No. 3:25-cv-00050 (D.V.I.). |
12/16/2025 |
Virgin Islands Government, Virgin Islands Police Department; Police Commissioner Brooks. |
Department’s administration and enforcement of 23 V.I.C. §§ 452–459 (USVI’s firearms licensing regime), including conditions on licensing (home searches, mandatory safe installation), processing delays, and “proper reason” carry requirement. |
Early discovery; mediation scheduled for June 16, 2026; bench trial expected November 1, 2027. |
|
United States v. District of Columbia, No. 1:25-cv-04458 (D.D.C.). |
12/22/2025 |
D.C. Government; Metropolitan Police Department of D.C.; Chief of Police Smith in initial complaint, Acting Chief of Police Jeffrey Carroll in amended complaint. |
Enforcement of D.C. Code § 7–2501.01, § 7-2502.01(a), and 7-2502.02(a)(6) (“assault weapons” ban). Enforcement of D.C. Code § 22-4514(a) in amended complaint (banning firearm suppressors). |
D.C. moved to dismiss March 18, 2026; amicus brief filed March 27, 2026; DOJ filed amended complaint in May 2026; D.C. response expected late June 2026. |
|
United States v. City and Cnty. Of Denver, No. 1:26-cv-01929 (D. Colo.) |
5/5/2026 |
City and County of Denver; Denver Police Department |
Enforcement of Denv. Colo., Rev. Mun. Code ch. 38, art. IV, § 38–121(c) and § 38-116(1) (“assault weapons” ban). |
Post-service; answer deadline stayed pending resolution of extension motion; recently reassigned to district judge. |
|
United States v. Colorado, No. 1:26-cv-01950 (D. Colo.) |
5/6/2026 |
State of Colorado; Colorado Department of Public Safety |
Enforcement of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-12-302 and 18-12-301(2) (large capacity magazine ban). |
Post-service; answer due late June, 2026; scheduling conference September, 2026. |
Each complaint invokes 34 U.S.C. § 12601, a federal pattern-or-practice statute historically reserved for addressing police brutality and systemic misconduct, to challenge state and local firearms regulations as unconstitutional.
This post surveys the SAS’s five complaints, explains the three constitutional theories underlying them, and examines whether § 12601 can support that enforcement strategy.
Background: Section 12601
Section 12601 provides that it is “unlawful for any governmental authority, or any agent thereof . . . to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers . . . that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” The statute authorizes the Attorney General to bring civil actions for “appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or practice.”
Originally enacted as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, § 12601 was a direct response to the 1991 beating of Rodney King, allowing the DOJ to step in where local police practices required federal intervention and oversight. For three decades, the Civil Rights Division’s use of § 12601 focused on “core issues in police reform common to many law enforcement agencies—such as patterns of unlawful use of force; unlawful stops, searches, and arrests; and racial discrimination.” The Division’s use of § 12601 typically involved extensive investigation, engagement with the department at issue, and attempted negotiation prior to litigation. Given the resources that these investigations require, and the political sensitivity of federal intervention into local policing, § 12601 has been used relatively sparingly.
The SAS’s use of § 12601 represents a significant departure from this tradition. The five complaints filed so far represent the Civil Rights Division’s “first-ever” affirmative litigation in support of expanding gun rights. Procedurally, with the exception of U.S. v. Los Angeles, no investigation or negotiation outreach appears to have occurred prior to suit. Furthermore, the presence of well-funded Second Amendment litigation may conflict with the Division’s core mission of protecting those lacking institutional access. As Christy Lopez, a former Civil Rights Division official now working at Georgetown, explains, “[p]roponents of Second Amendment rights have an abundance of political power that has allowed them to not only protect, but dramatically extend their rights . . . [j]ust because they don’t always get what they want, or because there are some process issues in getting them what they want, doesn’t mean they are a politically marginalized group.”
Five Complaints, Three Theories
The DOJ’s five complaints coalesce around three distinct theories of constitutional violation, largely centered around District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).
Theory One: Processing Delay
The first theory, raised in SAS’s complaints against Los Angeles and the Virgin Islands, alleges that bureaucratic slowness in processing permit applications amounts to a deprivation of individuals’ Second Amendment rights. The SAS relies on Bruen’s observation that “lengthy wait times in processing license applications . . . deny ordinary citizens their right to [possess or] public[ly] carry” a firearm.
In its suit against Los Angeles, DOJ alleges that, according to its own pattern-or-practice investigation, between January 2024 and March 2025, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department received 3,982 new concealed carry applications and approved only two. As of May 8, 2025, approximately 2,768 applications remained pending, with a median processing delay of 372 days.
Its suit against the Virgin Islands similarly alleges unconstitutional processing delays for licenses to possess or carry a firearm.
Theory Two: Permit Conditions
SAS’s second theory contends that D.C.’s and the Virgin Islands’ preconditions on firearms ownership impermissibly burden the exercise of Second Amendment rights. With respect to the Virgin Islands, DOJ alleges that certain permitting conditions are unconstitutional—specifically, the requirements that applicants (1) submit to a search of their home and install a gun safe and (2) have a “proper reason for carrying a firearm.” SAS analogizes the second requirement to the unconstitutional “may issue” regime in Bruen, wherein applicants had to demonstrate a “special need” for self-defense. The Court held that this impermissibly burdened the right to “carry handgun[s] publicly for self-defense” and delegated too much discretion to permitting officials.
The SAS’s complaint against the D.C., discussed further below, also implicates permitting conditions insofar as the District’s registration system effectively bars residents from possessing certain firearms and suppressors.
Theory Three: Categorical Weapons Bans
The third, and broadest, theory—found in the suits against D.C., Denver, and Colorado—challenges outright bans on specific categories of weapons.
SAS’s suit against D.C. alleges that the District’s registration system, which bars residents from registering AR-15s and other semi-automatic firearms, effectively makes possession of such weapons illegal, in violation of the Second Amendment. The amended complaints also challenges D.C.’s categorical ban on firearm suppressors. The Denver complaint challenges a municipal ordinance making it “unlawful to carry, store, keep, manufacture, sell, or otherwise possess assault weapons” within city limits. And the Colorado complaint challenges a state statute classifying possession of a “large-capacity magazine” as a class one misdemeanor.
Each of these complaints relies on Heller’s holding that the Second Amendment protects weapons “in common use” for lawful purposes, particularly those employed for self-defense. Because AR-15-style rifles and similar firearms are widely owned nationally, SAS argues that such state and local governments cannot categorically prohibit them.
Can § 12601 Be Used This Way?
The central question raised by these cases is a threshold statutory one: can § 12601 (the “pattern or practice” statute) be used in this manner?
The text of § 12601 is notably broad. The provision does not specify (1) what evidence is required to demonstrate “a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers,” and (2) which “rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States” fall within the provision’s reach.
Based on prior practice, DOJ’s § 12601 cases typically center on violations to the Fourth, Fifth, First, and Fourteenth Amendments. However, any constitutional right can support a § 12601 case. Considering Heller and Bruen’s assertion of Second Amendment rights as “fundamental,” SAS’s challenges appear to fit squarely within the scope of § 12601.
The first question—“what facts support a 12601 claim”—is the more difficult one. In their March 18, 2026 motion to dismiss, D.C. and the Metropolitan Police Department argued that § 12601 requires a pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct. The motion argues that officers enforcing duly enacted laws are not engaged in the kind of discretionary misconduct the statute targets. A March 27 amicus brief filed by sixteen former Civil Rights Division attorneys, alongside the Giffords Law Center and the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, echoed that concern, arguing that such an expansive reading runs counter to Congress’s intent of targeting “management, oversight, training, or other independent institutional choices.”
The use of § 12601 here may also raise federalism concerns; some observers, including former Attorney General Jeff Sessions, have questioned whether federal intervention into local law enforcement is appropriate absent clear institutional breakdown.
This divide is blurriest in the context of theory three: categorical weapons bans. If the unconstitutional “pattern or practice” is simply the enforcement of a duly enacted law, the SAS is effectively mounting a facial challenge to the statute itself. Taken to its logical conclusion, this theory could allow § 12601 to challenge any substantive criminal law that is actively enforced, so long as the underlying law is alleged to be unconstitutional. And what would the requested relief—in these cases, a permanent injunction barring enforcement—look like in practice, given potential tension with principles of federalism and legislative authority?
What to Watch
- Outcome in U.S. District of Columbia — This case is the litmus test. If the court grants the District’s motion to dismiss on the basis that SAS’s challenge to D.C.’s categorical registration ban is outside the scope of § 12601, that theory underlying the Denver and Colorado complaints could collapse. Conversely, if the court permits the case to proceed, it would open a door to a broader expansion of the statute’s reach.
- More Cases — Given the pace of filings (five complaints in under six months), additional suits targeting other jurisdictions with restrictive firearms laws appear likely.
- Settlements — Whether any of these cases settle merits close attention. A consent decree or settlement agreement could establish a de facto precedent for how jurisdictions structure firearms permitting, potentially bypassing the need for judicial resolution of the underlying statutory questions while still reshaping regulatory frameworks nationwide.
